Por Renan Filho · 2026-10-03**Lead**
In a postseason that has increasingly become a showcase for specialized, one-inning relievers, the Chicago White Sox turned back the clock on Saturday night. Closer Grant Taylor, a 24-year-old right-hander who spent most of the regular season as a setup man before being thrust into the ninth-inning role in September, delivered a four-inning save in Game 1 of the American League Division Series against the Cleveland Guardians. The 5–3 victory at Guaranteed Rate Field was not just a statement about Taylor’s arm — it was a tactical gamble that could reshape how managers approach high-leverage situations in October.
**Context**
The four-inning save is a relic of baseball’s past. In the 1970s and 1980s, closers like Goose Gossage and Bruce Sutter routinely worked multiple innings to finish games. But the modern game has evolved into a chess match of matchups, where relievers are often deployed for a single batter or inning. According to MLB data, the last four-inning save in the postseason came in 2018, when Chris Sale closed out the World Series for the Red Sox — though Sale was a starter by trade. For a true closer to record a save of four innings or more in the playoffs, one must go back to 2005, when Houston’s Brad Lidge threw four frames in Game 4 of the NLCS.
Taylor, who posted a 2.91 ERA and 12 saves during the regular season, entered the game in the sixth inning with the White Sox leading 4–2. Starter Dylan Cease had been pulled after five innings due to a high pitch count, and the Guardians had runners on first and second with one out. Manager Pedro Grifol opted to bypass his middle relievers and go straight to Taylor, a move that raised eyebrows in the broadcast booth. Taylor induced a double play to escape the jam, then proceeded to pitch the seventh, eighth, and ninth innings, allowing only one run on a solo home run by José Ramírez in the seventh. He struck out five and walked none, throwing 58 pitches — a workload that would have been unthinkable for most modern closers.
**Analise**
This decision by Grifol is a fascinating case study in the tension between analytics and intuition. The data-driven approach that dominates front offices today would typically dictate that a closer should not be asked to record more than three outs, especially in the playoffs, where every pitch carries amplified risk of injury or ineffectiveness. Yet Grifol’s move paid off, and it may force other managers to reconsider the rigid adherence to bullpen roles. The White Sox bullpen had been a weakness all season, with a collective ERA of 4.21 and a tendency to implode in high-leverage spots. By trusting Taylor to cover four innings, Grifol effectively shortened the game and removed the possibility of a middle-relief meltdown.
From a strategic standpoint, the four-inning save also conserves the rest of the bullpen for the remainder of the series. The White Sox now have a fresher set of arms for Game 2, while the Guardians’ relievers — who threw three innings in Game 1 — may be slightly more taxed. However, the risk is undeniable. Taylor’s pitch count of 58 is nearly double his season average per appearance. If he struggles in Game 4 or later in the series, the decision could be second-guessed. But for now, it has given Chicago a 1–0 series lead and a psychological edge.
**Fontes**
MLB.com — Game recap and pitch count data ESPN — Historical postseason save records Chicago Sun-Times — Manager Pedro Grifol postgame comments (paraphrased) Baseball-Reference.com — Grant Taylor 2026 regular season statistics